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COMMENT

FAIR WARNING: PREEMPTION AND
NAVIGATING THE BERMUDA

TRIANGLE OF E-SIGN, UETA, AND
STATE DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAWS
I.

INTRODUCTION

While Internet transactions are a small percentage of total business
transactions, the amount of business being conducted over the Internet
is growing.1 For the Internet to continue to grow, consumers and businesses must be confident that electronic transactions are safe and reliable. 2 One impediment to the prolonged growth and increased consumer
comfort in using e-commerce is the fear of fraud, 3 which can occur in two
ways. 4 First, the inability to authenticate, which is the method of determining the identity of the other party, can lead to fraud. 5 Transactions
1. David L. Gripman, Electronic Document Certification:A Primer On the Technology
Behind Digital Signatures, 17 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 769, 770 (1999).
2. Id.
3. See Internet: An Overview of Key Technology Policy Issues Affecting Its Use and
Growth, Congressional Research Serv. Rpt., 107th Cong. 11 (Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter
Internet]. The Department of Commerce reported that approximately four million people
were using the Internet, and in one year the number of Internet purchasers rose to ten
million. Id. It has been estimated that the amount of retail transactions generated domestically would top seven billion dollars by the end of 2000. Id. Additionally, despite the slow
down of the economy and the large numbers of dot.com companies going out of business, ecommerce continues to grow, though not at the robust rate of growth of the past year. Id.
Worldwide, e-commerce will continue to grow at a rapid rate because North America has
the most Internet users with 56.5 percent. Id. And while the Asian Pacific region has
nearly 16 percent of the world's Internet users, the rate of new users is growing at a rate
that is twice as fast as North America. Id.
4. Dan McGuig, Halve the Baby: An Obvious Use to the Troubling Use of Trademarks
as Meta Tags, 18 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 643, 645-46 (2000). Meta tags are a
form of Hyper Text Markup Language that surreptitiously provides information that is not
displayed to the person viewing that page. Id. at 646. The form of meta tag relevant for
this comment is the key word, which allows a search engines to find Web sites of a particular description. Id.
5. Thomas Smedinghoff, Moving with Change: Electronic Signature Legislation as a
Vehicle for Advancing Commerce, John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 735, 745 (1999).
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of dubious authenticity potentially expose a business to pranks that
waste valuable time and resources. 6 For example, if Amazon.com sends
a book to a person Amazon thinks ordered the book but in reality the
person neither wanted nor ordered anything from Amazon, Amazon loses
the price of obtaining and shipping the product.
Second, difficulty in verifying the integrity of a transmission can
lead to fraud.7 Before the parties can feel comfortable negotiating and
transacting business electronically, they must be comfortable in knowing
that the content of the transmissions are accurate and complete. 8 A contractor who gathers bids from subcontractors electronically must be certain that the bids submitted by the subcontractors are accurate and
complete. 9 When there is difficulty establishing either the authenticity
of the sender or the integrity of the transmission, it is easier for parties
to repudiate their contracts. 10 Concerns about authenticity, integrity,
and repudiation can create a significant barrier to using the Internet for
transactions and negotiations." To avoid these potential problems, a
business must do a significant amount of their transactions outside of
2
the e-commerce framework.'
For example, just because a message has the name Alden Hitchcock Smith III at the bottom of a document, it does not mean that Alden Hitchcock Smith III has actually signed the
document or that someone else was authorized to sign his name.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 746. Integrity of a document relates to whether the document received by
the sender is the same as the one sent. Id. Alden Smith may send a message to his attorney requesting certain confidential information. While Alden's attorney is certain that Alden sent the message, the attorney may be just as uncertain about whether or not the
communication has been intercepted or altered by an unauthorized third party, or that the
message transmitted was the complete message. While this example shows that there are
issues arising out of the actions of unscrupulous and deceitful parties, issues relating to the
integrity of a message can occur in innocuous instances, such as a message being garbled or
an interrupted during transmission. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. (citing Victory Med. Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117 (Ill. App. 1986)). The example in the text deals with a mistake or an alteration to the content during transmission. A
more nefarious example is when a party actively engages in fraud. For example, computers
can produce documents that are virtually indistinguishable from the original document.
One party can easily alter material provisions of the original document and claim that the
altered document is the original. Should two parties dispute the integrity of the other's
document, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to determine which party had the
original document and to enforce those provisions of the contract.
10. Smedinghoff, supra n. 5, at 746.
11. While this paper uses the term "consumer" quite often, the term as used in this
paper envisions the consumer being another business. It is important to remember that
the fastest growing sector of e-commerce is business-to-business exchanges. Internet,
supra n. 3, at 12. Domestic business-to-business transactions topped $200 billion in 2000
and will exceed $1.2 trillion by 2003. Id.
12. The Internet gives businesses the opportunity to significantly reduce their advertising costs by allowing small and medium sized businesses to electronically control their
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To work within the e-commerce framework, 13 businesses turn to encryption. 1 4 Electronic signatures and digital signatures are the present
day method of hiding the information in a transmission. 1 5 Digital signa16
tures promote the increased growth and development of e-commerce.
supply chain management, after sales support, and payment. Id.; see Mary Jo Dively, The
New Laws that Will Enable Electronic Contracting: A Survey of Electronic Contracting
Rules in the Uniform Electronic TransactionAct and the Uniform Computer Information

TransactionAct, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 209, 212 (2000) (stating that time, efficiency, and storage
space are benefits of electronic commerce); but see Bob Tedeschi, Large Companies Try to
Find Ways to Spread InternetRetailing Throughout Their Operation, N.Y. Times C14 (Oct.

15, 2000) (discussing large businesses working to create a sound business strategy for entering e-commerce); Bob Tedeschi, Compressed Data:Big Companies Go Slowly in Devising

Net Strategy, N.Y. Times C4 3 (Mar. 27, 2000) (discussing why business are so slow in
entering the area of e-commerce).
13. David Streitfeld, E-Commerce The Play: Act II: Bricks and Clicks Get Together,

Washington Post H01 T 34 (Oct. 22, 2000). E-businesses can not only create Web sites
containing product information but also use strategic alliances with other businesses to
attract consumer interest and customers at a cost that is significantly cheaper than traditional means of advertising. See id. at 34. Sneech.com-a DVD, game, and audio book
retailer-epitomizes the low cost e-business company by having two employees, no office
space, virtually no advertising, no interest on loans, and an invested capital of approximately $2,000. Id. Sneech.com, before creating and launching its Web site, entered into a
strategic alliance with Yahoo! in which for $100 a month, Yahoo! would place Sneech.com
on a shopping list with approximately 12,000 other merchants. Id. After offering a limited
number of products, Yahoo! offered Sneech.com the opportunity to become a featured shopping partner, and Sneech.com went on to create their own Web site and increased sales. Id.
The explosion of e-commerce has personal benefit as well. Rep. George W. Gekas, Early
Returns from Government Regulation of Electronic Commerce: What's New Is What's Old,

51 Admin. L. Rev. 769, 771 (1999). E-commerce reduces the cost of goods and services on
the one hand, and frees up people's time on the other; everyone may expect to have more
money to spend and more time to devote to living better lives. Id. E-commerce literally
means that, directly or indirectly, everyone gets more, including more food, better health
care, stronger families, and a better environment. Id. E-commerce has even benefited
small communities. See Larry Tye, In Haverhill,An Identity Crises Battered City Struggles

to Find a Sense of Community, Boston Globe Al 20 (Feb. 20, 2001) (mentioning that cyber
district and e-commerce played a significant role in the boom of a local economy).
14. Gripman, supra n. 1, at 774. Cryptography is the art of keeping information secure
and disguising a message in such a way that the substance of the message is not readily
understandable. Id. Disguising messages to keep them secure has been in practice since
antiquity, as when Lysander of Sparta used encryption to communicate with his soldiers on
the battlefield. Id.
15. W. Everett Lupton, Student Author, The Digital Signature: Your Identity by the

Numbers, 6 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 10,
5 <http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i2/note2.html>
(Fall 1999). In fact, electronic signatures are a combination of signature and code, which is
the method of changing a letter or a group of letters into another group of letters or symbols. Id. In the computer context, the encryption software applies a mathematical algorithm to the plain text, the readable text, which then produces unreadable cipher text.
Gripman, supra n. 1, at 774.
16. Sanu K. Thomas, Student Author, The Protection and Promotion of E-Commerce:
Should There Be a GlobalRegulatory Scheme for DigitalSignatures, 22 Fordham Intl. L.J.

1002, 1008 (1999).
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By addressing concerns of authenticity and integrity, electronic and digital signatures give businesses a measure of comfort in negotiating and
transacting electronically. 17
Section one of this comment examines the digital signature legislation throughout the U.S. to determine if such legislation does, in fact,
remove these barriers to e-commerce and provide a clear and easy framework for conducting business electronically. Section two provides general background information regarding digital and electronic signatures.
Specifically, the section briefly describes the types of state laws that
were enacted to govern the use of digital and electronic signatures. After
introducing the federal legislation, section three discusses the preemption provisions of the new federal law. Specifically, section three assesses the impact of the preemption clause on the tapestry of existing
state digital signature laws and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
("UETA"). This comment concludes by suggesting a new preemption provision that does not place onerous requirements on the parties desiring
to conduct business electronically and provides clarity and precision that
is lacking in current federal, state, and uniform signature laws.
II. BACKGROUND
Over forty states have enacted digital and electronic signature legislation.1 8 The Utah Digital Signatures Act (the "Utah Act") was the na17. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Presentation, Digital Signatures: The Key to Secure
Internet Commerce at 8 (Glasser Legal Works 1998); but see Jane K. Winn, The Emperor's
New Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signatures and Internet Commerce, Revised Draft Mar. 9, 2001 <http://www.smu.edu/-jwinn?shocking-truth.htm> (accessed Apr.
16, 2001) (discussing theories as to why the use of digital signatures "have not lived up to
the hype"). There can be a great deal of confusion when reading literature about digital
and electronic signatures. Smedinghoff, supra n. 5, at 728 (endnote omitted). Much of the
confusion results from the sloppy use of the terms digital signature and electronic signature. An electronic signature can be almost anything because it is commonly defined to be
"any electronic mark signifying agreement" to a transaction. Lupton, supra n. 15, at T 5.
More recent definitions of electronics signatures broaden the term so much that sounds or a
retinal scan of the party would be considered an electronic signature. Id. In any event,
regardless of the statute defining the term, most definitions have four characteristics that
are indicative of an electronic signature: (i) the sound, mark, or symbol must be in electronic form; (ii) there must be an intent by the signor to transmit that sound, mark, or
symbol; (iii) an intent to be bound by the terms and (iv) there is no specific technology
described. On the other hand, a digital signature is not, as some would think, a digitized
version of one's signature but rather pieces of electronic communication transmitted between the sender and the recipient. Id. at
7. Technically, a digital signature is the
"transformation of a message using an asymmetric crypto-system or a hash function such
that a person having the initial message and the signer's public key can accurately determine if the holder of the private key sent the message and if the message has been altered
in some way. Id. at 10.
18. Thomas, supra n. 16, at 1010. Before the attempts to create a uniform law relating to signatures and e-commerce, state legislation could be classified into three categories.
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tion's first comprehensive digital and electronic signature legislation. 19
The Utah Act, interestingly, was not broad enough to give legal protection to both digital signatures and electronic signatures. 20 Under the
Utah Act, as well as under the statutes of other states following the
mode of the Utah Act, 2 1 digital signatures receive legal protection only if
Smedinghoff, supra n. 5, at 739-42. Statutes that only give legal effect to digital signatures
that are the product of a specific technology-technology specific statutes. Id. The second
type of statutes are those that do not require a digital signature to be the product of a
particular technology but do establish certain criteria that the method of affixing a digital
signature must satisfy to receive legal effect. Id. at 738. These statutes are attribution
statutes. Finally, enabling statutes neither prescribe a specific technology nor establish
certain criteria that the signature method must satisfy. Id. at 742. Essentially enabling
statutes parallel the common law statute of frauds paper-writing requirement, which gives
legal effect to a signature as long as (i) there is a writing; (ii) a signature on the writing;
and (iii) the signature must be by the person or an agent of the person to be bound by the
contract's terms. E.g. S.C. Code Ann. § 26-5-30 (2000) (defining electronic signature "any
identifier or authentication technique attached to or logically associated with an electronic
record that is intended by the party using it to have the same force and effect as a manual
signature.").
19. Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-3-101 et seq. (1999). Utah created the law so that, inter alia,
relying on secure messages would increase the number of e-commerce transactions and
minimize the amount of forgeries and fraud occurring in e-commerce. Id. at § 46-3-102. A
valid digital signature is one that has the same effect as a traditional signature if the document bears "in its entirety the digital signature," and the digital signature is verified by a
public key listed on a certificate issued by a licensed certification authority. Id. §46-3401(a)-(b).
20. Id. §46-3-103(10). There are two types of digital signature encryption: symmetric
key cryptography and asymmetric key cryptography. Gripman, supra n. 1, at 773-75.
Symmetric key cryptography is a method in which the sender and recipient of a message
use the same key to encrypt and to decrypt the message. Id. at 773. In the digital world,
the sender of a message uses an algorithmic key to translate information from plain text to
cipher-text. Id. at 774. In order to decrypt the message, the recipient must use the same
key that the sender used to encrypt the message. Id. Symmetric key cryptography is not
altogether unfamiliar in the U.S. In 1977, the U.S. adopted a Data Encryption Standard,
which was based on a symmetric algorithm. Id. at 775. One of the most significant
problems with symmetric cryptography is maintaining the secrecy of the key. Thomas,
supra n. 16, at 1009.
21. Gripman, supra n. 1, at 775. In the digital era, the use of symmetric key encryption is rife with security complications that would severely compromise the benefit of transacting business over the Internet. Id. First and foremost, because sender and recipient use
the same key, it is imperative that both parties protect the secret key. See Thomas, supra
n. 16, at 1010. In the event a third party discovers the secret key the third party, at the
very least, could read the encrypted message. Id. At worst, by having the secret key, the
third party may intercept, read, alter, or send messages without the recipient having any
reason, on the face of the transmission, to assume that the sender is an unauthorized third
party. Id. Another security problem arises when the parties have to transmit information
about the secret key over the Internet which is not secure. Id. Due to the lack of security
on the Internet it is inadvisable to transmit information without some sort of encryption.
Gripman, supra n. 1, at 775. Consequently, if a business wants to use symmetric key encryption, it must either transmit the information over the Internet, at the risk of another
party receiving the information, or engage in a face-to-face dialogue to ensure that no one
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asymmetric key cryptography produced the digital signature. 22 While
intercepts the key. Id. At the point that a business picks up the telephone, uses the postal
mail, or has a face-to-face meeting, whatever potential business advantage the Internet
offers a company has been lost.
22. Thomas, supra n. 16, at 1010. This is a method of encryption created in 1978 by
Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman in which encoding and decoding a message is no longer dependent on the use of the same key but on the use of two mathematically related keys. Id. This is referred to as the "RSA method." Id. The RSA method is the
most powerful and widely used asymmetric key cryptography system on the Internet.
Gripman, supra n. 1, at 776. Asymmetric key cryptography uses two keys; one is private,
the other key is public. Id. These keys are called a private-public key pair because they are
mathematically linked to each other. Id. The two keys are linked such that if one key
encrypts a message, the other key decrypts the message. Id. Asymmetric key cryptography does not pose the same security risk as does symmetric key cryptography because the
parties use keys that are mathematically related but not the same. Thomas, supra n. 16, at
1010-11. The complexity of the mathematically related keys ensures that no one can reverse engineer one key to decipher the algorithm of the other. Id. at 1012. With algorithms
serving as the essential component in the manipulation of data and the changing of information from text to digits, these algorithms are the foundation of asymmetrical cryptography. Lupton, supra n. 15, at
11. The RSA system creates two number parts of the
encryption that creates a private-public key pair. Thomas, supra n. 16, at 1010. The first
number comes from the encoding process; the second number is the product of a random
mathematical computation and becomes part of the public key. Id. Another method of
creating a digital signature is called "hashing." Like RSA, hashing also employs the use of
an algorithm. Lupton, supra n. 15, at 11. Using the algorithm means if any of the characters change in a digitally signed message, the string of characters changes and produces
a new, different a series of characters. Id. For example, the sender composes a message
and runs it through a "one way hashing function"-an algorithmic function that takes the
original message and creates a unique message digest. Gripman, supra n. 1, at 777-78.
Each digest-the string of characters-is created in a fixed length that is small enough "to
be enciphered as the message substitute in the construction of the actual digital signature
with the private key." Lupton, supra n. 15, at
11 This allows for large plain text
messages to be represented as the digital signature formation in a short string known to
the user's encryption software. Id. Because hashing is a mathematical function, if any
part of the digitally signed message were changed, the program would create a different
message digest. Id. Accordingly, each message digest is unique to the original message.
See Gripman, supra n. 1, at 778. Next the sender will encrypt the message digest with his
private key, attach the original, unencrypted message, and send to the recipient. Id. For
the recipient to decipher the information and to verify the digital signature, he must be
familiar with the hashing algorithm of the sender. Id. The recipient must first down oad
the sender's public key to decode the accompanying message digest. Id. To verify the message, the hashing algorithm must be applied to the plain text message that was sent; so,
the recipient will take the original unencrypted message that the sender also sent and run
that through the hashing function to produce a second message digest. Id. at 779. If there
is a change in the digitally signed message, there is a corresponding change in the digest
that causes a failure of the verification process. Id. On the other hand, verification of the
message occurs when the second message digest is exactly the same as the first message
digest. Id. Additionally, an unauthorized third party cannot take the digital signature
from one document and affix it to another document because each digital signature is
unique to a specific document. Id.
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some state laws were similar to the Utah Act, 2 3 other state laws were
fundamentally different from the Utah Act. 24 These states passed laws
that protected not just digital signatures, but signatures that satisfied a
criteria set forth in technology neutral statutes. 25 Instead of giving legal
effect to a specific technology, technology neutral statutes provide legal
protection for digital signatures or electronic signatures if they comply
26
with the statutory criteria.
By protecting electronic signatures only if they satisfy certain statutory criteria, California's statute is an example of technology neutral or
"attribute legislation" as it has also come to be known. 27 One of the benefits of the legislature, was that businesses could use other types of digital signature technology, which may be less expensive and less
complicated than public key encryption ("PKE"). 28 In the event a
cheaper digital signature technology comes along, the cheaper method
23. Smedinghoff, supra n. 5, at 741. States that passed legislation similar to the Utah
Digital Signatures Act were Washington, Minnesota, Missouri, and New Hampshire. Id.
24. Id.
25. Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-401. A protected digital signature is one that was verified
by the public key in a certificate issued by a licensed certification authority; the signature
was affixed by the signer with the intention to sign the message; and the recipient does not
have information that the signer is in breach of a subscriber agreement, presumably with
the certification authority, or that the signer is not the proper owner of the private key. Id.
§ 46-3-401(a)-(c). Requiring the use of certification authorities or trusted third parties who
use trustworthy systems to verify the authenticity of a transmission is another salient distinguishing feature of the Utah Act. Id. § 46-3-102(38).
26. Smedinghoff, supra n. 5, at 739 (providing citations for state digital signature statutes). Before state legislatures began implementing the UETA, well over one third of the
states opted for digital signature legislation of this kind. Id.
27. Cal. Govt. Code § 16.5(a) (West 1999). Under the California Code, a digital signature had the same effect as a handwritten signature if five criteria were met. Id. The
signature had to be unique to the person using the digital signature, capable of verification
and under the sole control of the person using it; the date attached to the digital signature
must be attached in such a way that if the date is changed the signature is invalidated; and
had to conform to the rules and regulations established by the Secretary of State. Id.
These five elements are not exhaustive because a governing body is free to determine the
number and criteria that must be met to give legal effect to a digital signature. E.g. U.N.
Comm. Intl. Trade L., Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 1996, Part I, Art. VII, subpara.
1 (a) - (b) [hereinafter UN Model Law]< http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm > (accessed
July 17, 2000). The United Nations Committee on International Trade Laws ("UNCITRAL") has factors different from those in the California statute. Id. UNCITRAL requires
that the digital signature must include a method to identify the signer; indicate the signer's
approval of the information contained in the document; and "the method used was as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the message was created or generated in
light of all of the circumstances." Id.
28. Trusted third parties are places that act as a bank in holding the digital signatures. Kalama M. Lui-Kwan, Recent Developments in Digital Signature Legislation and
Electronic Commerce, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 463, 466 (1999). In fact, these trusted third
parties, also known as certification authorities, can be a bank or company specializing in
digital signature technology. Id.
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must only satisfy the statutory conditions to receive the same legal status as a handwritten signature. 2 9 One more significant difference between California's signature legislation and Utah's is that California
does not mandate the use of certification authorities or trusted third parties for the verification of a digital signature and the issuance of
30
certificates.
Another type of technology neutral statute is enabling legislation.
Enabling legislation merely provides protection for electronic signatures
without specifying that the signature must be the product of a certain
technology or satisfy a set of statutorily defined criteria. 3 1 Enabling legislation can potentially cause significant problems because the legislation does not have the specificity of technology specific statutes. 32 For
example, the Utah Act devotes significant attention to the creation, requirements, and functions of certification authorities and trusted third
parties. 33 Enabling statutes, like that of South Carolina,3 4 do not address, in detail, any issues relating to certification authorities and
29. Cal. Code Regs. tit. II, § 22002(a) (West 1999).
30. Id. While there is no mention of PKE and accepted technologies in the California
Code, regulations supplement the Code with more specific information relating to the use
of digital signatures and any other type of technology. Different from the Code, the regulations state that only accepted technologies may be used in producing digital signatures. Id.
Acceptable technologies must be capable of creating a digital signature that is capable of
satisfying the five factors set out in California Government Code section 16.5. Id. The
regulations establish that "[t]he technology known as Public Key Cryptography... is an
acceptable technology for use by public entities in California." Cal. Code Regs. tit. II,
§ 22003(a). Signature dynamics is another type of digital signature technology that is an
acceptable technology under California law. Id. § 22003(b). Signature dynamics measures
the characteristics of a signature on a flat surface and through the use of cryptographic
techniques binds the measurements to the message. Id.
31. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 26-5-10 et seq. (2000). Under the South Carolina Electronic
Commerce Act, an electronic signature is "any identifier or authentication technique attached to or logically associated with an electronic record that is intended by the party
using it to have the same force and effect as a manual signature." Id. § 26-5-30(4). A
broader law is the Illinois Act which states that any record generated, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means for use in an information system or for transmission
from one information system to another satisfies any law requiring a writing or a written
record. See 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 175/5-105 (2000). Under the Illinois Act, the definition of
electronic signature is broad enough to encompass both digital signatures and electronic
signatures. Id. Unlike South Carolina's law, the Illinois Act gives increased legal protection for signatures classified as secure electronic signatures, which are signatures that can
be verified by using a qualified security procedure. Id. § 175/10-110(a). A qualified security procedure is one that either party agreed upon or was approved by the Illinois Secretary
of State. Id. § 175/10-110(a)(1)-(3). The criteria the Illinois Secretary of State uses is
roughly similar to the criteria used by the California Secretary of State. Compare Cal.
Govt. Code § 16.5(a) with 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 175/5-110(a)(1)-(3).
32. Compare S.C. Code Ann. §§ 26-5-30 et seq. with Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-3-101 et seq.
33. Id. § 46-3-104; see generally R. Jason Richards, The Utah Digital SignatureAct as
"Model" Legislation: A Critical Analysis, 17 John Marshall J. Computer & Info L. 873
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trusted third parties. 35 Moreover, enabling legislation does not even
carry the detail of the California legislation. 36 It is true that the California laws do not carry as much specificity as technology specific legislation, but at least California provides a list of specific criteria that digital
37
signature methods must follow in order to receive legal protection.
Under enabling legislation, anyone signing their name or mark to a
transmission receives full legal protection so long as there is an intention
to sign. 3 8 The broadness of enabling statutes makes them untenable in
addressing the concerns of e-commerce users because there is very little
security for businesses.
The net result of this collage of state signature legislation was a confusing web of digital and electronic signature laws sprawling virtually
across the entire country. 3 9 Compounding this problem is the universal
nature of the Internet and e-commerce. If digital signature laws in Utah
are different from those in South Carolina, then what law applies if a
South Carolina company is conducting business with a customer in
Utah? Attempting to harmonize business practices with a variety of
state laws will certainly increase the transaction costs of e-businesses,
which will effectively drive smaller businesses from the global marketplace. 40 Imagine if a South Carolina business had to familiarize itself
with all of the nuances of the state signature laws of its potential customers. The cost would be prohibitive to a small company and very
likely to a large one as well. Furthermore, a company would certainly be
unable to engage in business activities with any meaningful celerity if
they took the time to address these nuances. To resolve these issues, the
federal government passed the Electronic Signatures in Global and Na41
tional Commerce Act ("E-Sign").
(1999) (discussing the many provisions of the Utah Act addressing certification
authorities).
34. S.C. Code Ann.. §§ 26-5-10 et seq.
35. See Lupton, supra n. 15, at 15 (stating PKE can only be successful if there is a
trusted third party to link the holder of an encryption key to an actual person).
36. Compare S.C. Code Ann.. §§ 26-5-10 et seq. with Cal. Code Regs. tit. II, § 22002(a).
37. Cal. Code Regs. tit. I, § 22002(a).
38. Smedinghoff, supra n. 5, at 741-42.
39. See President William Jefferson Clinton, Speech, Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act 8 (Washington, D.C., June 30, 2000) (available on Westlaw
2000 WL 1279512 (Leg. Hist.)) (claiming that the new federal legislation will provide legal
certainty for businesses to invest in and expand e-commerce).
40. For example, imagine what would happen if the two employees of Sneech.com had
to spend their time tailoring their transactions with customers so that each transactions
conformed to the state law of each customer. Surely, this would stretch the human resources of Sneech.com to the breaking point and, at the very least, eliminate the efficiency
offered by online transactions.
41. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001 et
seq. (2000). National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
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E-Sign attempts to establish uniformity and clarity in the area of
electronic signatures and electronic records. 4 2 Congress also intended
that E-Sign would promote the use of electronic signatures and electronic records while avoiding the creation of a regulatory structure that
would stifle the growth of e-commerce. 4 3 Continued growth of e-comestablished a wide consensus on what is necessary to eliminate the unintended impediments to e-commerce while not overriding laws that create the necessary requirements for
the validating electronic signatures. H.R. Subcomm. on Cts. and Intell. Prop., Hearing on
H.R. 1714, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 106th Cong. 5
(Sept. 30, 1999) (Testimony of Pamela Meade Sargent, Commissioner for the NCCUSL)
[hereinafter Sargent Testimony]. UETA was written over a two year period by NCCUSL
under two guiding principles. Id. at 4. First, all solutions must be technology-and-business-model neutral. Id. at 5. Second, UETA only creates a framework for electronic commerce, meaning that there will be no displacement of a jurisdiction's applicable substantive
law of or the creation of a new regulatory regime. Id. UETA interacts with existing state
laws to assure that the results of transactions do not vary solely on the basis of the technology selected by the transacting parties. Id. at 18. Primarily, E-Sign and UETA provide
three things: (i) an electronic signature or electronic record cannot be denied legal enforcement solely because they are electronic; (ii) if the law requires a writing, use of an electronic record satisfies the law; and (iii) if the law requires the use of a signature, use of an
electronic signature satisfies the law. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 7001 with U.E.T.A. § 7 (1999).
42. H.R. Rpt. 106-341(I), Purpose and Summary at 1 (Sept. 27, 1999) (stating that
the purpose of the legislation was "to facilitate the use and acceptance of electronic signatures and records in interstate and foreign commerce"). In addition to the morass of state
digital signature legislation that created the need for federal legislation, some argue that
this need for uniformity initially came about roughly two decades ago when U.S. businesses
first began using electronic data interchange to contract for the very first time. Robert A.
Witte & Jane K Winn, E-Sign of the Times, 3 <http://www.kl.com/PracticeAreas/Technology/pubs/page20.stm> (accessed Feb. 10, 2001). With electronic data interchange, automated electronic contracting systems eliminated the need for employees to communicate
with other consumers or businesses via traditional means, such as telephone, telexes. Id.
In short, the creation of and subsequent reliance on electronic data interchange parallels
the concerns over e-commerce in that companies that have a pre-existing relationship can
easily reduce agreement to a writing, but significant issues arose when there was communication between parties absent a preexisting relationship. Id.
43. H.R. Rpt. 106-341(I), supra n. 42, Background and Need for Legislation at
11
(Sept. 27, 1999). "The legislation is narrowly drawn so as to remove barriers to the use and
acceptance of electronic signatures and electronic records without establishing a regulatory
framework that would hinder the growth of electronic commerce." Id., Purpose and Summary at 1. Congress believed that the greater predictability and certainty embodied in ESign would nurture the continued growth of e-commerce. Id., Background and Need for
Legislation at 12. The lack of uniformity of electronic signature legislation not only has
an effect on the U.S. e-economy but also on American businesses competing abroad and the
ability of American businesses to remain at the forefront of business development. H.R.
Subcomm. on Cts. and Intell. Prop., Hearingon H.R. 1714, Allowing Use of Electronic Signatures,106th Cong. at 10 (June 9, 1999) (testimony of Jeffery Skogen, Internet Market
Manager for the Credit Department of Ford Motor Company) [hereinafter Skogen Testimony] (finding that the lack of uniform nationwide rules may inhibit our country's ability
to influence developments beyond its borders).
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merce notwithstanding, 44 another benefit to e-businesses is greater legal
certainty and predictability in their transactions. 45 Principally, E-Sign
ensures that no signature or record will be denied legal effect because it
is in electronic form. 46 E-Sign broadly defines electronic signatures as
"an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person
with the intent to sign the record." 47 PKE is a process logically associated with a record and indicates an intent to sign; consequently, the
broad definition of electronic signature applies equally to PKE.4 8 Unlike
state legislation, not only does E-Sign give general protection to parties
using electronic signatures, but also provides specific provisions in the
49
area of consumer protection.
44. H.R. Subcomm. on Cts. and Intell. Prop., Hearing on H.R. 1714, Allowing Use of
Electronic Signatures, 106th Cong. at T[4 (June 9, 1999) (testimony of David Peyton, Director of Technology Policy of the National Association of Manufacturers) [hereinafter Peyton
Testimony]. Business-to-business transactions account for far larger e-commerce transactions than consumer sales, and legal uncertainty and nonconformity force firms to use paper contracts for interstate commerce precluding complete automation. Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 11 (indicating that a uniform laws will allow businesses to fully automate
their transactions to the point where industry would save billions). Interestingly, Congress
understood that NCCUSL spent years struggling with the best way to fashion a model law
that would create the uniformity and certainty that was necessary. See e.g. H.R. Rpt. 106341(11), Purpose and Summary at 4 (Oct. 15, 1999). Yet, the fear that all 50 states would
not adopt UETA and thus would still create a lack of uniformity in the law compelled Congress to continue its work with E-Sign. Id. (finding that the lack of uniformity and certainty still poses a barrier to the growth of e-commerce). It is interesting to note that in the
September 27, 1999, report Congress suggested that the failure of half of the states to
adopt UETA would be problematic in achieving the goals of uniformity and certainty but in
the October 15, 1999, report Congress believed that anything short of adoption of all states
would be anathema for uniformity and certainty. Compare H.R. Rpt. 106-341(I), supra n.
3, Background and Need for the Legislation at 12 with H.R. Rpt. 106-341(11), 42, Purpose
and Summary at [ 4.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a). There are four things that E-Sign protects: (i) an electronic
record or an electronic signature cannot be denied legal effect solely because they are in
electronic form; (ii) if the law requires a writing, use of an electronic record satisfies the
law; and (iii) if the law requires the use of a signature, use of an electronic signature satisfies the law. Id. UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce has a rather significant
influence on the provisions of E-Sign as well as UETA, for that matter. See generally UN
Model Law, supra n. 28.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5).
48. See id. E-Sign is different from state technology neutral statutes in that most of
the state technology neutral statutes usually have a list of accepted technologies in which
PKE was included; E-Sign has no separate provision. Compare Cal. Govt. Code § 16.5(a)
with 15 U.S.C. § 7006(5). The broad definition of an electronic signature encompasses technologically produced digital signatures and signatures as simple as a person typing their
name at the bottom of an e-mail.
49. Id. § 7001(c). Consumers have the right to elect to receive electronic records in lieu
of receiving a written record if two conditions are met. First, the consumer must affirmatively consent to receive the electronic record and has not withdrawn his consent. Id.
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During the legislative development of E-Sign, 50 Congress was
acutely aware of the need to respect state law and the processes of the
"NCCUSL." 5 1 As E-Sign was originally written, it was believed that
draft legislation placed stringent limitations on a state's ability to alter
the effect of the federal legislation. 52 Many of the critics of the earlier
preemption provision argued that if a state adopted UETA, the state
would still be subject to the provisions of E-Sign to the extent that the
state did not meet a number of ill-defined criteria. 5 3 Taking this concern
54
to heart, Congress reexamined the bill during two mark-up sessions.
As a result of these mark-up sessions, the preemption provision was ex55
tended to UETA as reported to the state legislatures by NCCUSL.
Congress had several concerns: first, that a substantial number of states
would not adopt UETA in a short period of time, and, second, that some
states would not follow UETA and would develop their own standards for
accepting electronic signatures that might not be compatible with
UETA. 5 6 A compromise was to allow E-Sign to be the law until a state
passed UETA, at which point E-Sign would expire. 5 7 Unfortunately, the
House of Representatives did not accept this compromise and passed
H.R. 1714, which was modified by the Conference Committee and subse§ 7001(c)(1). In order for the consumer to show affirmative consent to receiving the record
electronically, there must be a reasonable demonstration that the consumer will be able to
receive the electronic record to which consent is given. Id. The second condition is that
prior to giving consent, the consumer must be provided a clear and conspicuous statement
notifying him of his rights and options to have the electronic record made available on
paper and the right to withdraw consent for receiving the records electronically. Id.
§ 7001(c)(1)(B). The statement must contain information notifying the consumer of any
right he has to receive the record on paper or other non-electonic form; the procedures the
consumer must use to withdraw consent or to update his electronic address; whether the
consent is for information relating to a single transaction or categories of information or
records that may be provided during a relationship; how the customer may request a paper
copy of any electronic record; and the hardware and software requirements necessary for
accessing electronic documents. Id. § 7001(c)(1).
50. The House version of the E-Sign was H.R. 1714, and the Senate's version was S.
761. Thomas E. Crocker, The E-Sign Act: In Facilitation of E-Commerce, 3 Cyber Tech
Litigation Report 1, 4 (2001).
51. Id. at 22.
52. H.R. Subcomm. on Cts. and Intell. Prop., Hearing on H.R. 1714, Allowing Use of
Electronic Signatures, 106th Cong. at T 18 (Sept. 9, 1999) (testimony of Andrew J. Pincus,
General Counsel for the U.S. Department of Commerce [hereinafter [Pincus Testimony]).
53. Id. at

19.

54. Crocker, supra n. 50, at 11.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. Congressional leaders even attempted to amend the bill with a substitute measure that was based on the compromise in the Senate bill S 761, which would have not
recognized the preemption of state law. Id.
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quently passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate. 58
III.

ANALYSIS

Under U.S. law, federal statutes can either mutually co-exist with
59
relevant state laws or the federal laws can supersede the state law.

A.

STATE LAW AND THE ABILITY TO PREEMPT E-SIGN

There are three conditions that will cause the federal law to preempt
a state law. First, a federal law preempts state law if the federal law
contains language expressly preempting state law. 60 While E-Sign has
an effect that may be classified as preemptive, there is nothing in the
federal statute to indicate an express preemption of state law, 6 1 other
than those statements contained in section 7002 of E-Sign. 62 Furthermore, Congress did not draft E-Sign with such specificity and depth that
63
would give rise to a preemptive effect.
Second, if the federal law governs the entire field of activity, it will
preempt state law. 6 4 Federal statutes that seek to occupy the entire
58. The proposed compromise of the Senate was more favorable for two reasons. First,
the Senate version did not preempt state legislation addressing electronic signatures that
was consistent with section 6(a), prohibiting the denial of a contract because an electronic
signature or electronic record was used in its formation, and Section 6(b), allowing the
parties to determine the technologies or business models they wish to use, of S. 761.
Crocker, supra n. 50, at 5. Second, a state did not have to enact the final version of UETA
without modification or amendment. Id. The Senate bill allowed for the state version of
UETA to receive protection if the states enacted UETA substantially as reported to the
state legislatures by NCCUSL. Id.
59. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2000) with 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)-(prohibiting federal courts from construing a federal statute that would invalidate, impair, or supercede
state laws involving insurance regulation); see also FirstNat. Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 130 (1969) (reasoning that federal law regarding national bank branches
does not preempt state laws governing the operation of national branches). Section 301 of
the Copyright Act abolishes common law in the area of copyright by eliminating the 1909
Copyright Act's dual federal and state copyright protection and creates stringent standards
that must be met before the federal law preempts state law. See 15 U.S.C. § 301(a).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 301; see Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983).
61. See e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a).
62. Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Signatures and Records, A New Perspective, 17
Computer & Internet L. 8, 19 (2000).
63. Id. When Congress attempts to preempt a field of law that has traditionally been
occupied by the states, congressional intent to displace a state law in that field must be
clear and manifest. Jones v. Rath Packing, Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). E-Sign must
have a provision that clearly expresses the intent of Congress to preempt applicable state
laws. Presumably, these clear and manifest testaments of congressional intent must be
within the statute itself and not merely in the legislative history, which is not the law.
64. English v. General Electric, Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-80 (1990); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that preemption also occurs where an act of
Congress "touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal sys-
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field, such as the federal Bankruptcy Code or the Copyright Act, are typi65
cally far more extensive in their coverage of topics within the field.
The very nature of E-Sign suggests that Congress did not intend for ESign to occupy the entire field. 6 6 E-Sign is a statute of a very narrow
scope which does not cover all of the legal areas relating to electronic
67
signatures.
Finally, if a state law will frustrate and conflict with a policy objective of federal law, the federal law preempts state law. 68 The policy objective of E-Sign is to promote e-commerce by providing: that electronic
signatures and electronic records are legally sufficient; 69 consumer protem will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject"); but see
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (stating that matters outside of the
preemptive reach of Congress are not preempted).
65. Nimmer, supra n. 62, at 20.
66. Id. Because the policy of E-Sign is that a requirement in law that a contract be
signed can be met by an electronically signed contract, E-Sign can be classified as a narrow
statute that does not attempt to occupy the entire field of transactions, although an argument can be made that E-Sign is an attempt to occupy the entire field. Focusing on the
concept of "the field," one can argue that people asserting that E-Sign does not occupy the
field assume that the relevant field is contracts or transactions. However, those arguing
that E-Sign does occupy the field see the field as electronic contracting. Clearly, E-Sign is
an attempt to occupy the field of electronic contracting. E-Sign's raison d'etre was the potpourri of state legislation that hindered the growth of e-commerce. Congressional statements regarding the purpose of E-Sign speak to the need and the desire to create
uniformity and certainty in order to promote e-commerce and to increase consumer comfort
with electronic transactions. It seems counter-intuitive for Congress to respond to the need
for uniformity and legal certainty by creating a law that that does not occupy the entire
field. The argument that E-Sign is not as extensive as the Bankruptcy Code and therefore
does not occupy the field is specious for two reasons. First, for a myriad of reasons, one
being the creation and explosion of e-commerce within the past six years, issues relating to
electronic contracting are very limited, or, at the very least, not as numerous as those
presented by bankruptcy or copyright. Consequently, a law relating to electronic contracting will be, by comparison, less extensive than those areas that have their roots in the
common law of England. Second, these fundamental differences between electronic contracting and bankruptcy make comparing the extensiveness of their respective statutes
futile. There are, however, enough areas within electronic contracting to find that E-Sign
was not meant to occupy the entire field. As previously discussed, E-Sign's broad definition
of electronic signature includes digital signatures. It is common that many technologyspecific statutes impose insurance requirements or registration requirements on certification authorities. These areas are not covered in any provision under E-Sign but have been
addressed in some state digital signature laws. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-104.
67. Nimmer, supra n. 62, at 20.
68. FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Raul, 973 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963) (finding federal preemption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with the state
and the federal requirements); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 57 (1941) (arguing that
preemption occurs where a state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.").
69. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a).
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tections; 70 requiring the retention of and access to electronic records; 7 1
guidelines for the notarization of electronic transactions; 72 and provisions relating to the business of insurance, insurance agents and brokers.7 3 If a state law conflicts with these provisions of E-Sign, the state
law will fall to E-Sign's preemptive effect. However, there is little evidence in E-Sign to suggest that its preemptive effect applies to state sig74
nature laws falling outside of the policy objectives of E-Sign.
E-Sign does not have a preemptive effect for state signature laws
falling outside of the provisions articulated in section 7001. However, ESign's preemption functions in a very unique manner because there are
two conditions under which a state can exercise control over E-Sign. 75
However, there are two provisions that must be addressed when considering whether a state law has been preempted by E-Sign. The first provision is section 7002(a)(1), and section 7002(a)(2) is the second
provision.
B.

THE CLEAN VERSION OF

UETA

A state can pass a statute, regulation, or other rule of law that modifies, limits, or supersedes the provisions of section 7001 of E-Sign. 76 Section 7002(a)(1) provides that any state statue, regulation, or other rule of
law must be an enactment or adoption of UETA as approved by NCCUSL. 7 7 However, section 7002(a)(1) provides that any exemptions to
the state version of UETA made under UETA section 3(b)(4) is preempted to the extent it is inconsistent with Title I or,78 Title II, 79 or not
70. Id. § 7001(c).
71. Id. § 7001(d).
72. Id. § 7001(g).
73. Id. § 7001(i)-O).
74. Nimmer, supra n. 62, at 21.
75. See id., at 21-22. Professor Nimmer finds E-Sign's preemption provision unique
and curious because no federal statute has a provision that functions in the same manner
as E-Sign's. Id.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 7002.
A State statute, regulation, or other rule of law may modify, limit, or supersede
the provisions of section 7001 with respect of state law only if such State statute,
regulation, or other rule of law constitutes an enactment or adoption of the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act as approved and recommended for enactment in
all the States by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1999, except that any exception to the scope of such Act shall be preempted to the extent such exemption is inconsistent with the title or title II, or
would not be permitted under paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of this subsection.
Id. § 7002(a)(1). Interestingly, the House of Representatives included a provision that the
states had to enact UETA within four years from the enactment of E-Sign. See H.R. Rpt.
106-341(1), supra n. 42, Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation at 8.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1).
78. Id. §§ 7001 et seq.
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permitted under section 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii). 8 1
Section 7002(a)(1)'s cross-reference to subsection (a)(2)(A)(ii) is very
important.8 1 The insertion of the cross-reference means that if a state
passes UETA with 3(b)(4) exemptions, the exemptions cannot afford
greater legal status to a specific technology or technical specification for
electronic signatures.8 2 Given that section 7001(a)(1) states that E-Sign
preempts UETA Section 3(b)(4) exemptions to the extent they are inconsistent with Titles I and II, does this mean that the rest of the exempted
law remains in force? Or does it mean that E-Sign preempts the entire
exemption? The language of the statute suggests that the conflicting
part of the exemption will be preempted because E-Sign preempts "to the
83
extent" the exemption is "inconsistent with" the provisions of E-Sign.
Some commentators suggest that any modification or amendment to
UETA means that E-Sign preempts UETA. 8 4 On the other hand, there
are those who argue that there must be more than a de minimus modification, alteration, or amendment before E-Sign preempts UETA.8 5 Failure to be mindful of E-Sign's objectives leads to the erroneous conclusion
that E-Sign should only preempt the state version of UETA when the
modifications or amendments are material. First, the principal purpose
79. Id. § 7021. This section provides the criteria for addressing electronic negotiable
instruments. Primarily, these provisions address the creation, transferability, and enforceability of holding electronic notes against the issuer or the obligor. Id. The specifics of this
provision are outside of the scope of this comment and will not be discussed in detail. Section 7021, however, will be referred to in this comment as Title I.
80. Id. § 7002(a)(1). This provision is critical because it closes a loophole in UETA.
UETA section 3(b)(4) allows a state to exempt specific transactions from the state version of
UETA so long as there is a state law governing a particular transaction. U.E.T.A. § 3(b)(4)
(stating that UETA does not apply to "other laws ... identified by the State"). There is
evidence to suggest that NCCUSL saw section 3(b)(4) as a catch all provision for exemptions because the "[d]rafting Committee recognized that some legislatures may wish to exclude additional transactions from the Act." Id. at 3(b)(4) cmt. 9. The Drafting Committee
provides guidance as to whether or not a state should use the 3(b)(4) exemption for certain
types of transactions. One of the areas addressed by the Drafting Committee is consumer
protection laws. While the comment suggests that a state legislature should not use the
section to exempt consumer protection provisions, these comments only provide guidance
and, thus, are not legally binding. Consequently, it is possible, without section 7002(a)(1),
for a state to exempt from UETA laws requiring the disclosure of certain information.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1),
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Nimmer, supra n. 62, at 17. Professor Nimmer argues that the state enactments of
UETA must be clean ie., free of modification and amendments. Id. The change could be as
minor as an alteration of a definition or as significant as a modification of any of UETA's
provision, such as the consumer consent provisions. Under E-Sign's section 7002(a)(1) any
change to the final version of UETA will invalidate the modified state version of UETA and
allow E-Sign to remain in effect. Id.
85. Crocker, supra n. 50, at 23.
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for creating a federal law was to give a uniformity, predictability, and
legal certainty as opposed to the previous legal regime where laws differed from one state to the next.8 6 Also, allowing states to make minor
variations to UETA creates a lack of uniformity that would be no better
than the previous state-based regime. Even under the new regime, businesses and consumers would still be left with a framework that potentially varies from state to state. Second, section 7002 contains a limiting
instruction that seems to suggest that only exemptions that are inconsistent with E-Sign or prohibited under subsection 7002(a)(2)(ii) would be
preempted.8 7 This means that E-Sign already provides a state the flexibility to make minor modifications to a state version of UETA.8 8 Accordingly, there is no need to loosely interpret section 7002(a)(1).
Section 7002(a)(1) provides another alternative for a state seeking to
escape federal legislation.8 9 This provision could be interpreted to mean
that E-Sign will not preempt state law if the law is either an enactment
of the NCCUSL-approved version of UETA or the law is not a NCCUSLapproved version of UETA but is technology neutral. 90 Only a very close
reading of section 7002(a)(1) leads to this conclusion, and admittedly, the
close reading relies very heavily on interpreting the placement or misplacement of a comma. 9 1 However, such a reading would create a loophole while closing UETA's Section 3(b)(4) loophole. 92 A close reading
would allow for flexibility in making changes to UETA that are not substantive. 9 3 The technology that supports the digital revolution rapidly
changes and evolves to the point where different challenges arise. Flexibility to make nonsubstantive changes to UETA may provide the steady
86. Compare S.C. Code Ann. §§ 26-5-30 et seq. (enabling legislation) with Utah Code
Ann. §§ 46-3-101 et seq. (creating a technology-specific regime in Utah).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1). Section 7002(a)(1) provides that "any exception to the
scope of such Act enacted by a State under section 3(b)(4) of such Act shall be preempted to
the extent such exception is inconsistent with this title or title II, or would not be permitted
under paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of this subsection." Id.
88. Under E-Sign, if a state passes a version of UETA that contains modifications or
amendments, the state is not adopting the final version of UETA as proposed by NCCUSL
as required by section 7002(a)(1). However, the state can then use section 7002(a)(2). If
the state version of UETA is consistent with the provisions of 7002(a)(2), the state version
of UETA supersedes E-Sign.
89. Id.
90. Crocker, supra n. 50, at 23.
91. Id. at 23. Here is where legislative history would be a great asset. Unfortunately,
the conference report of H.R. 1714, the House version of E-Sign, is merely a restatement of
the text of the bill without the supporting or clarifying statements of the managers of the
bill. Id. at 12. This means that there is no authoritative legislative history. Consequently,
there is no guidance as to whether section 7002(a)(1) should be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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framework that is necessary for wide spread use of digital and electronic
94
signatures.
In order to determine whether or not E-Sign preempts state laws, a
person must examine the laws on a state-by-state basis. A business
must decipher whether a state adopted UETA, and if the State did adopt
UETA, does the state version contain 3(b)(4) exemptions. If a business
determines that a state version of UETA does in fact contain 3(b)(4) exemptions, the business must make a determination as to whether the
exemptions are consistent with Titles I and II of E-Sign. If the business
determines that the exemptions are inconsistent with Titles I and II,
then E-Sign preempts. Yet, it is uncertain whether E-Sign preempts the
entire exemption or only those provisions which are inconsistent with
Titles I and II. Remember that we are uncertain whether the final provision in section 7002(a)(1) means that the state version of UETA must, in
addition to being consistent with Titles I and II, also be technology neutral or whether the state version must be either consistent with Titles I
and II or be technology neutral. A business has to make several educated guesses as to the meaning of the laws. The above assumes that the
state has adopted a clean version of UETA-one that has no alterations,
amendments, or modifications.
Despite the confusion section 7002 poses, there are some parts that
afford clear answers. Several parts are self-evident. If a state adopts a
clean version of UETA, the state version of UETA replaces E-Sign and is
valid and enforceable. If a state passes a clean version of UETA and uses
UETA's section 3(b)(4) to exempt the same laws that are exempted under
E-Sign, 95 E-Sign will not preempt these exempted provisions because
they are not inconsistent with Title I of E-Sign.
94. Remember that under the Illinois Act, an electronic signature receives legal effect
if it meets the standards that are substantially similar to those delineated in the California
statute. Cal. Code Regs. tit. II, § 22002(a). Yet, the Illinois Act goes farther than other
attribute-legislation statutes because it affords greater legal protection to electronic signatures and records that are the either secured electronic records or secured electronic signatures, which are records or signatures that are verified by using a secured system. 5 Ill.
Comp. Stat. § 175/10-110(a)(1)-(3).
95. E-Sign exempts state laws relating to
(1) a statute, regulation, or other rule of law governing the creation and execution
of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
(2) a State statute, regulation, or other rule of law governing adoption, divorce, or
other matters of family law; or
(3) the Uniform Commercial Code, as in effect in any State, other than sections 1107 and 1-206 and Articles 2 and 2A.
(b) Additional exceptions. The provisions of section 101 [15 USCS § 7001]
shall not apply to(1) court orders or notices, or official court documents (including briefs,
pleadings, and other writings) required to be executed in connection
with court proceedings;
(2) any notice of-

2001]

FAIR WARNING

If, however, the state exempts laws that go beyond the reach of ESign's exemptions, E-Sign preempts those laws because they are modifications that are inconsistent with Title I. For example, a state provision
exempting insurance brokers from the signature provisions would be
preempted by E-Sign because Congress intended for the provisions of Title I to apply to the business of insurance. 96 Consequently, exempting
the business of insurance from the state version of UETA is a modification that is inconsistent with Title I, and thus preempted. Preemption
even occurs when a state passes a clean version of UETA and exempts a
law under section 3(b)(4) that does not contain consumer consent provisions. Such a law would be preempted because it too is inconsistent with
Title I of E-Sign, which carries very clear and extensive consumer-consent provisions. Finally, if the state enacts a clean version of UETA that
mandates the use of a particular technology, E-Sign preempts that provision as well because such a law, even if exempted under 3(b)(4) would
fail the technology neutral provision of section 7002(a)(2).
C.

STATE LAW AND ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES

E-Sign allows states that decide, for whatever reason not to pass a
clean version of UETA to create their own signature statutes. 97 But in
order for the state's legislation to supersede the provisions of the federal
legislation, the state statute must comply with the conditions articulated
in subsection (a)(2). 98 First, the alternative procedures or requirements
proposed by the state must be consistent with Titles I and II of E-Sign. 99
Second, the alternative requirements or procedures cannot give greater
(A) the cancellation or termination of utility services (including water,
heat, and power);
(B) default, acceleration, repossession, foreclosure, or eviction, or the
right to cure, under a credit agreement secured by, or a rental
agreement for, a primary residence of an individual;
(C) the cancellation or termination of health insurance or benefits or life
insurance benefits (excluding annuities); or
(D) recall of a product, or material failure of a product, that risks endangering health or safety; or
(3) any document required to accompany any transportation or handling of
hazardous materials, pesticides, or other toxic or dangerous materials.
15 U.S.C. § 7003.
96. Id. § 7001(i)-().
97. Id. § 7002(a)(2).
98. It is important to note that E-Sign allows the states to pass legislation that does
not have to comport with the provisions of section 7002(a)(2). Specifically, the technology
neutral provision does not have to be satisfied if the state statute, regulation, or rule of law
pertains to a state acting as a market participant-where the state competes in a market
as if it were a private corporation. Id. § 7002(b). While section 7002(b) is an important
provision, this comment will focus only on the effect of the preemption provisions contained
in section 7002(a), and, thus, section 7002(b) is outside of the scope of this comment.
99. Id. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(i).
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legal status to "the implementation or application of a specific technology
or technical specification for performing the function of creating, storing,
generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic
records or electronic signatures." 10 0 Finally, if the state enacts the alternative requirement after E-Sign's enactment, the alternative must spe1°1
cifically mention E-Sign.
It is important to remember that the second provision also functions
as a savings provision. If a state passes a version of UETA that has provisions that do not conform to E-Sign, the state's finding that their version of UETA does not fit into section 7002(a)(1) may attempt to validate
the law using section 7002(a)(2)(A). Yet, while this can function as a
savings provision, there is a potential problem. Section 7002(a)(1) has a
provision addressing the UETA's section 3(b)(4) exemptions, but section
7002(a)(2) does not have a similar provision. 10 2 Consequently, this
means that exemptions made under section 3(b)(4) of UETA fail section
7002(a)(2) because they are inconsistent with Title I of E-Sign, 10 3 and so
10 4
too does the entire statute.
So, how does section 7002(a)(2) function? If a state passes UETA
with modifications, the law will not be preempted if the provisions are
not inconsistent with E-Sign or are not technology specific. This should
be the result regardless of whether the provisions of the state version of
UETA conform with NCCUSL's version of UETA. Additionally, if a state
passes a version of UETA that contains modifications and has section
3(b)(4) exemptions, the state version of UETA and the exemptions would
be reviewed for consistency with E-Sign. Provisions that are either inconsistent with E-Sign or violate E-Sign's technology neutral requirement should cause the state version of UETA and the exemptions to be
preempted.
These preemption clauses serve as a disincentive to engage in e-commerce because the question of what law applies still remains unanswered.' 0 5 Essentially, E-Sign's preemption provision causes the entire
statute to fall far short in achieving its essential function-to promote
clarity and to promote uniformity of U.S. signature legislation. 10 6 The
fact that section 7002(a)(1) addresses UETA's section 3(b)(4) exemptions
100. Id. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii).
101. Id. § 7002(a)(2)(B).
102. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1) with 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(2).
103. Crocker, supra n. 50, at 25.
104. Id.
105. Cf.Sargent Testimony, supra n. 41 at 23. Only UJETA, as adopted in state law,
stands alone as the source of law of electronic records and signatures. Id. at 24.
106. Id. at 24-25 (noting that the preemption provision of E-Sign is very difficult to
interpret). "One could make a serious argument that [15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)] encourages
nonuniformity [sic] rather than uniformity." Id. at 25.
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while section 7002(a)(2) does not is a major source of confusion. Additionally, there is no legislative history to assist in the interpretation of
whether section 7002(a)(1) requires the state version of UETA to be consistent with Titles I and II and the technology neutral requirement, or
whether the state version of UETA can survive section 7002(a)(1) analysis if it is either consistent with Titles I and II or technology neutral.
Combining the lack of illustrative legislative history and a vagueness of
these provision that borders on chaotic, 10 7 judicial interpretation is left
as the only means of delineating the scope and application of E-Sign or
state versions of UETA. However, allowing a state court or even a federal court to clarify something that is intrinsically obscure could lead to
inconsistent common law. l0 8
D.

NEW PREEMPTION PROVISIONS

In order for E-Sign to promote e-commerce and business and consumer
confidence in electronic transactions, 10 9 Congress should amend E1 10
Sign.
This comment suggests a method by which this may be accomplished. A possible solution is amending section 7002(a)(1) of E-Sign to
read that all state statutes, regulations, or other rule of law must
constitute:
an enactment or adoption of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act as
approved and recommended for enactment in all States by the National
107. Id. at 24. Without further clarification, UETA and E-Sign section 7002(a) are a
hybrid of field and subject preemption, which without further explanation leads to no predictable interpretation. Id.
108. It is not as if this is without precedent. In 1939, the Restatement of Torts created a
definition of a protectable trade secret that is widely used in many state statutes. Linda B.
Samuels and Byron K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The States' Response, 24
Creighton L. Rev. 49, 53 (1990). Because the Restatement of Torts failed to address such
issues as the applicable statute of limitations and the availability of injunctive relief, many
state courts had differing interpretations of the approach to trade secret protection. Id.
Courts that addressed the misappropriation of trade secrets consistently relied on the Restatement of Torts as their source for the common law principles but interpreted the provision in different ways. Brandon S. Cate, Saforo & Assoc., Inc. v. Porocel Corp.: The Failure
of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Clarify the Doubtful and Confused Status of Trade
Secrets Common Law Principles, 63 Ark. L. Rev. 687, 695-696 (2000).
109. Clinton, supra n. 39, at 9-10. Companies will have the legal certainty they need
to invest and expand in e-commerce by being able to purchase products and services and to
potentially save billions by retaining records in electronic form. Id. at T 9. Ironically, President Clinton also suggested that by not favoring one form of technology over another will
"unleash the full potential of the digital economy." Id. at$ 7.
110. See e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 7005(b). It is apparent what that one of the principal goals of
E-Sign is the promotion of e-commerce. E-Sign requires that the Secretary of Commerce
and the Federal Trade Commission file a report with Congress one year after the enactment of E-Sign addressing not only the benefits to the consumers but also the benefits to ecommerce. Id.
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999, except
that any exception to the scope of such Act enacted by a State under
section 3(b)(4) that is inconsistent with Titles I, Title II, or 7002(a)(2) is
preempted in its entirety. 1 1 1
The first problem that E-Sign must address is its relationship with
UETA. Remember that the underlying purpose of both E-Sign and
UETA is to create uniformity, predictability, and certainty of laws relating to electronic signatures and records. 1 12 The current version of ESign provides that it can be superseded by UETA if the state enacts
UETA as approved by NCCUSL. However, confusion remains as to the
extent of E-Sign's preemptive effect if a state makes minor modifications
to UETA but retains its critical provisions. Moreover, there is confusion
as to whether 3(b)(4) exemptions must be consistent with Titles I and II
and be technology neutral. The new provisions make it clearly understood that any modification, de minimus or material, to UETA will cause
the state's version of UETA to be preempted in its entirety. 11 3 For example, in California, the current version of UETA with all of its modifications and amendments would be preempted by E-Sign until California
passes an unmodified version of UETA. Additionally, this new provision
also addresses the confusion regarding the 3(b)(4) exemptions by requiring that the exemptions be consistent with Titles I and II of E-Sign and
the new section 7002(a)(2). Making the exemptions consistent with Titles I and II of E-Sign is a sensible way to promote uniformity in exempted state laws. For states adopting the unamended and unmodified
version of UETA, E-Sign should also clarify that its provisions are default provisions where terms or provisions conflict with UETA, 114 E-Sign
111. App., 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1).
112. H.R. Rpt. 106-341 (II), supra n. 43, Background and Need for the Legislation at 2.
113. App., 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1). One might be able to make the argument that a new
provision should be more like the Senate version, S. 761, in that a state can pass a version
of UETA that is substantially similar to the final version proposed in July 1999 by NCCUSL. The problem is that there is still the potential for a lack of uniformity. Under the
Senate version, each state may make modification or amendments to UETA so long as the
state version is substantially similar to the final version. First and foremost, there is no
way to determine what changes can be made before a state version is no longer substantially similar. Second, if the states make different modifications and amendments to
UETA, there will not be any consistency among the state versions of UETA. Adopting the
Senate version will not address the lack of uniformity on the state level.
114. There are several provisions that UETA addresses that E-Sign either fails to address fully or even contemplate. E-Sign provides that contracts formed by one or more
electronic agents cannot be denied legal effect. 15 U.S.C § 7001(h); see 15 U.S.C. § 7006(3)
(defining electronic agent as "a computer program used independently to initiate or respond to electronic records without review by an individual at the time of the action").
UETA provides a little more specificity in the protection of contracts formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual, who is acting on his own behalf or for another
person. UETA § 14. UETA protects any interaction where "the individual performs actions that the individual is free to refuse to perform and which the individual knows or has
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prevails.1 1 5 However, an exception can be made in situations where
there is a conflict and UETA provides greater protection than does E1 16
Sign.
Moreover, under the current system, a business has no idea if the
current California version of UETA, or any other state version of UETA
with amendments and modifications, applies, whether the amendments
and modifications apply but the rest of UETA does, or if E-Sign applies. 117 Furthermore, a business would still likely find itself confronting the issue of trying to comply with different versions of UETA.
An e-business now has to attempt to comply with California's UETA,
which might be different from Virginia's version of UETA. 118 This problem is reminiscent of the pre-E-Sign days where a business had to be
aware of the various types of state legislation and conducted business
accordingly. 119 The new section 7002(a)(1) simplifies these considerations immensely. If a state has a version of UETA that has any modifications whatsoever, E-Sign is the applicable law, regardless of whether the
modification is as minor as removing an adjective. If the state has a
clean version of UETA, businesses and consumers can be assured that
UETA applies. Most importantly, if a state has 3(b)(4) exceptions, one
only needs to ask three questions. First, is the exemption consistent
with Title I? Second, is the exemption consistent with Title II of E-Sign?
reason to know will cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction or performance."
Id. § 14(2). Essentially, this provision states that agreeing to a click-through agreement
falls within the provisions of UETA.
115. Nimmer, supra n. 62, at 23. One such area where E-Sign grants more protection
than does UETA is in the area of consumer protection. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c) with
U.E.T.A. § 5.
116. UETA addresses in great detail attribution, but E-Sign fails to cover this topic.
U.E.T.A. § 9. A signature is attributable to a person only if it was performed by an act of
that person. Id. § 9(a). The act of attribution can be shown in any manner, such as by the
actions of human or electronic agents. Id. UETA, unlike E-Sign, also establishes specifications for how to determine when a document is sent or received. Id. § 15. Additionally, in
an area that is not addressed at all in E-Sign, UETA provides guidelines for the effect of a
message that has been changed during transmission. Id. § 10.
117. The California version of UETA adds provisions under the section entitled "Use of
Electronic Records and Electronic Signatures," the notarization and acknowledgement section and the time and place of sending and receipt section. Additionally, the California
version removes sections 16 through 20 of the NCCUSL version of UETA. Sections 16
through 20 in NCCUSL's version address transferable records and use of electronic records
by government agencies. Cal. Gov't Code § 16.333.
118. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia have enacted the final version of UETA
but have also made additions or deletions to their versions which make the adopted state
version different from the final version of UETA as proposed by NCCUSL.
119. For a discussion about the failure of state laws to create a uniform standard, review supra nn. 16-35 and accompanying text.
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Third, is the exemption consistent with the new section 7002(a)(2)? If
the answer to any of these questions is in the negative, E-Sign preempts
the provision in its entirety. This uniformity and clarity creates another
benefit for businesses and consumers-predictability. Under this new
method, businesses will be able to fashion their business models and
Web sites accordingly, and consumers can readily discern which statutory provisions apply. A provision causing E-Sign to become inapplicable
if all of the states passed unmodified versions of UETA would avoid fur120
ther complications.
Another change for E-Sign would be to embrace the technical specifications for producing an electronic record or electronic signature-a new
section 7002(a)(2). 12 1 It goes without saying that using either the publicprivate key method or the hashing method is inherently more secure in
authenticating the other party and verifying the integrity of the document. 122 To promote this type of security, E-Sign, taking a page from
the Illinois Act, 123 should give greater legal protection for those methods
that afford a more reliable method of authenticating the party and the
integrity of the transmission. 1 2 4 Legislation giving greater legal protec125
tions to PKE promotes the development of more PKE software.
120. It has been suggested that E-Sign should be a federal law of limited duration. Pincus Testimony, supra n. 52, at. 15 (stating that E-Sign should be limited to a temporary
federal rule to ensure the validity of electronic agreements entered into before states enact
the UETA). "Once the UETA is adopted by a State, the federal rule [E-Sign] would be
unnecessary and should 'sunset'." Id.
121. App., 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(2) (prohibiting a state from providing greater legal effect
to a particular method of affixing digital signatures). Allowing for greater legal protection
for digital signatures produced by PKE is only one part of the process to help e-commerce
reach its potential. Peyton Testimony, supra n. 44, at 8S (stating that "before electronic
commerce can reach its full potential, business must be provided assurance that traditional
signature law encompasses electronic authentication"). A party to an electronic transaction may use a variety of methods to evidence his identity or his agreement to the terms of
a contract-electronic authentication"-such as, a previously agreed code-word or with an
electronic facsimile of his written signature created by an electronic stylus, a digital signature, or some biometric technology. Pincus Testimony, supra n. 52, at 06.
122. Gripman, supra n. 1, at 779. "Digital signatures using public key encryption technology enable parties to transact business over the Internet by verifying the identities of
the parties and the integrity of the messages communicated." Id.
123. Under the Illinois Act, a secure electronic signature must satisfy three levels of
scrutiny: an analysis of the security procedure; if the electronic record or document has
been altered since a particular point in time; and if the electronic signature is a signature
of a particular person. 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 175/5-105, 105(a), 110(a). In a civil matter,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the electronic record has not been altered since the
record went through the secure procedure. Id. § 175/10-120(a). In the case of electronic
signatures, if the signature has gone through a secure process, the presumption is that the
signature correlates to the person it represents. Id. § 175/10-120(b).
124. See Appendix 1.
125. Martin I. Behn, The Illinois ElectronicCommerce Security Act: Too Much Too Soon
or Too Little Too Late, 24 S. Ill. U. L.J. 201, 208 (2000). One of the arguments in support of
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First, the new section requires alternative procedures or requirements to be consistent with Title I and Title II. This correlates with the
new section 7002(a)(1). Moreover, this section also addresses a shortcoming of the original section by requiring that any 3(b)(4) exception attempting to find protection under this section must also be consistent
with Titles I and II and the subsections of 7002(a)(2). Second, subsection
(a)(2)(A)(ii) provides that the alternative procedure may give greater legal effect to electronic signatures that are the product of a specific technology. 12 6 Essentially, this provision is a complete reversal of the former
version of 7002(a)(2)(ii) in that there is no technology neutral requirement. Technology specific procedures only receive legal protection if by
using a qualified security procedure, 1 2 7 it can be verified that an electronic signature is the signature of a specific person.' 28 There is no reason why methods that allow for greater accuracy in authentication and
verification of message integrity should receive the same legal protection
as a person typing their name at the bottom of an electronic purchase
order. 129 Furthermore, this change allows for the creation of a more seenacting legislation to promote the development of a PKE is that using public key cryptography and verifiable certificates is the best method for sending secure, authenticated
messages over the Internet. Id. Therefore, legislation is needed to support these methods
of transmitting secure transactions. Id
126. "Alternative procedures or requirements for the use or acceptance electronic signatures to establish the legal enforceability of contracts may accord greater legal status to the
implementation or application of a specific technology or technical specification for performing the functions of creating electronic signatures." See Appendix 1.
127. Under the new section a "qualified security procedure" is one that is:
(1) previously agreed to by the parties; or
(2) certified by the Secretary of Commerce as being capable of creating, in a trustworthy manner, an electronic signature that:
(A) is unique to the signer within the context in which it is used;
(B) can be used to objectively identify the person signing the electronic record;
(C) was reliably created by such identified person, and that cannot be readily
duplicated or compromised; and
(D) is created, and is linked to the electronic record to which it relates, in a
manner such that if the record or the signature is intentionally or unintentionally changed after signing the electronic signature is invalidated.
128. The relying party must also show that the qualified security procedure was (i) commercially reasonable under the circumstances; (ii) applied by the relying party in a trustworthy manner; and (iii) relied on in a reasonable manner and in good faith by the relying
party.
129. To receive protection as a secure electronic signature under the Illinois Act, the
signature must be protected by a qualified security procedure. 5 Ill. Comp. Stat §§ 175/10105. There are two ways to determine a qualified security procedure. First, it is a procedure that is mutually agreed upon by the parties. Id. § 175/10-110. Second, the Illinois
Secretary of State certifies that a procedure is capable of providing reliable evidence that
the electronic signature has not been altered. Id Additionally, the Secretary of State can
certify that the procedure is capable of creating, in a trustworthy manner, an electronic
signature that: (i) is unique to the signer within the context it was used; (ii) can be used
objectively to identify the person signing the electronic record; (iii ) was reliably created by
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cure digital signature technology that may be far less expensive and far
more accessible. 130 One of the most important features of this provision
is that it allows the parties to determine what qualifies as a security
procedure, which has several advantages. First, this provision still respects the principles of contracting-that parties must come to a meeting
of the minds over certain provisions during contract formation. Second,
this provision allows parties to use methods that may be more inexpensive and readily available for them to use in electronic transactions. Finally, allowing parties to come to an agreement regarding what
constitutes a qualified security procedure for an electronic signature may
provide the parties another, more simple, means of enforcement-breach
of contract.
Allowing a state to pass technology specific legislation gives rise to a
few concerns. There is the concern that parties with an advantage in
bargaining power may use such a provision to the disadvantage of consumers. This concern could be resolved by adding a provision that prohibits a party from conditioning electronic transactions upon the use of a
particular method of affixing electronic signatures. 13 1 A clear line would
that person; and (iv) if the record or the signature is intentionally or unintentionally
changed after signing, the electronic signature is invalidated. Id.; see generally Behn,
supra n. 125, at 215 (listing the six factors that a court must consider when determining
whether a procedure is commercially reasonable). Determining whether a procedure is a
"qualified security procedure" is a two-step process. The first step requires a finding that
the security procedure is a qualified procedure; the second step, assuming the procedure is
found to be qualified, indicates whether the qualified procedure is secure.
130. One of the reoccurring themes in the legislative history is a concern regarding technology-specific legislation. Some may assume that Congress did not want to be seen as
playing favorites for a particular technology. However, congressional testimony indicates
that the concern among businesses is that technology specific statutes may become outdated faster than technology neutral provisions. See Skogen Testimony, supra n. 43, at 9.
The fear is that the technology industry is rapidly changing and with that so does the
technology affecting electronic signatures. Technology specific statutes cannot be amended
or modified fast enough with keep pace with the changes in technology. Id. (arguing that
technology neutrality will serve to guard against regulations that quickly become outdated
and impede the development of e-commerce, both domestically and internationally). Consequently, technology-specific statutes will hinder businesses from using the most cutting
edge technology, which will most likely be more efficient, cost-effective, and user-friendly.
See id. This not only indicates the fundamental problem with technology-specific legislation but also reveals the need for flexibility in the law. The way to address the concern is to
create a statute that provides the flexibility for businesses to use the recent technology
while assessing the security potential of such technologies. If the digital signatures increase the ability to authenticate the party and to verify the integrity of the transmission,
it should receive greater legal protection. Such a statute does not deprive businesses of
legal protection when using newer technologies and provides an incentive for the continued
development of more secure electronic signature technologies.
131. See Sargent Testimony, supra n. 41, at
21. Including technology specificity
within the legal protection of a uniform law is a power that could likely be exercised
against one part of the computer information industry on behalf of another segment, which
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be drawn in that the statute would not require the use of these secure
technologies, but would require the parties to come to an agreement if
they chose to use a secure technology. 132 Another concern is if one party
uses a secure technology while the other party does not. While it is im13 3
portant to acknowledge, it is not a significant concern.
The suggested provisions of E-Sign would also go further than both
the original version of E-Sign and UETA by encouraging the use of a
specific technology by giving them a presumption.Y" Parties using a
gives rise to "unfortunate implications of anti-trust." Id. at 21. Ms. Sargent frets that
the lack of standards for exercise of the power is likely to lead to misuse. Id. These new
provisions result in a perilous foray into federal-state relations by creating a law that dictates to the states the process in making rules of law. Id. at 26. There is the distinct
possibility that these provisions exceed the boundaries of Congress' express powers. Id.
Essentially, E-Sign gives state legislators a choice. State legislators must either allow federal law to govern an area that has been solely the province of the state or create a state
law following the provisions established by federal law. If the legislators choose federal
law, the federal law mandates that they choose whether E-Sign or UETA applies. In the
event legislators decide not to follow E-Sign but that UETA with some modifications is
more consistent with state common law, the legislators are in a Catch-22. If they modify
UETA to accommodate state common law and preferences, E-Sign applies. On the other
hand, if state legislators adopt UETA without modification, they have a version of UETA
that might not be exactly consistent with state common law and preferences.
132. Of course, the statute must be clear on when an agreement between the parties has
taken place. In order to be consistent with the rest of E-Sign and UETA, the provision
would allow for an agreement to use a secure technology to be communicated via conduct
and surrounding circumstances. For, example, if Party A uses his private key to affix a
digital signature and Party B uses the corresponding public key, this action on the part of
Party B is tantamount to consenting to use this secure technology.
133. This is not a significant concern because for both parties to use digital-signature
technology, both parties must have or, at least, have access to the particular method of
encryption and decryption. If Party A uses his private key to affix a digital-signature,
Party B must use the corresponding public key to open the message. At the point that
Party B opens the message using the public key, an agreement to use secure technology can
be implied. On the other hand, if Party B does not have the technology to use the public
key, then the message cannot be opened, authenticated, or its contents verified; the same
holds true for using the hashing function. In the House version of E-Sign, H.R. 1714, there
was a provision that prohibited a state from creating legislation that required the use of a
technology that is not specific and is not publicly available. H.R. 1714 § 102(b). This provision could easily be resurrected and incorporated into the new section of E-Sign, which
would ensure that any secure technology would be available to all parties.
134. See U.E.T.A. § 9(a) cmt. 4. UETA recognizes that there may be a greater legal
protection for using a digital signature, but the amount of legal protection depends on the
agreement between the parties. Id. While UETA does not provide a rebuttable presumption, it is feasible that there may be a rebuttable presumption if the parties agreed to it. Id.
Once a signature is attributable to a person UETA provides that the effect of the signature
will be determined in light of the surrounding context and surrounding circumstances, including any agreement between the parties. Id. For example, Alden and Acme agree that
transmissions signed with signature dynamics require the recipient to prove that the message has been altered. Under UETA, signature dynamics may receive greater legal effect
in this contractual relationship.
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particular technology to produce an electronic signature would have a
rebuttable presumption in a civil matter. 13 5 It is well established that
these acceptable or secure technologies authenticate the party attaching
a digital signature to a transmission and can indicate tampering or alteration with the content of the transmission. 136 Moreover, the ability of a
party to repudiate the terms is vastly diminished, at the very least in
comparison to other methods of attaching an electronic signature.
Therefore, placing the burden of proof on the person attempting to repudiate the terms merely acknowledges the technical difficulties of repudi13 7
ating the terms contained in a secure transmission.
Creating a rebuttable presumption encourages people to use these
secure methods while at the same time allowing them to use other means
if it suits them.' 3s Also, the creation of a presumption promotes the continued development of easier, more efficient, more secure, and cheaper
methods of assigning digital signatures because of the advantage in using a technology that increases the capability to authenticate the sender
139
and to verify message integrity.
The new section 7002(a)(2) also contains a provision directing the
U.S. Department of Commerce to draft, review, and classify the attributes for secure technologies, which serves as an important first step toward insuring the legitimacy and efficacy of new technologies. 14 0 More
importantly, the new provision establishes certain preconditions that
must be met before there is any evaluation of whether a technology qual135. "In resolving a civil dispute involving a secure electronic signature, it shall be
rebuttably presumed that the secure electronic signature is the signature of the person to
whom it correlates." Appendix 1.
136. Gripman, supra n. 1, at 779.
137. NCCUSL, Aug. 15, 1997, draft of UETA §§ 301-303 <http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm> (accessed Mar. 15, 2001). In the earlier drafts of UETA, there was a
provision allowing the creation of secure electronic signatures. Behn, supra n. 125, at 225
(citing Ben Beard, Reporter's Memorandum http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ulc frame.htm (accessed Mar. 15, 2001)) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uecita/etam/
1197.htm> (accessed Mar. 15, 2001). NCCUSL omitted this provision from the final version because they feared that the technology and the market lacked the sophistication to
fully utilize any presumptions. Id.
138. Clinton, supra n. 39, at 7 (stating that one of the essential principles of E-Sign is
that the law should "give individuals and organizations maximum freedom to form contracts as they see fit").
139. See e.g. Behn, supra n. 125, at 208-209. One of the industries that would be affected by the increased legal protection for digital-signature technology is the certification
authorities. Id. While the article presents four arguments as to why public key infrastructure should not be legislated right now, the article does not address giving greater legal
effect to digital signature legislation while protecting other forms of electronic signatures.
Id. at 209.
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 7005(b) (requiring the Secretary of Commerce and the Federal
Trade Commission after 12 months of the enactment of E-Sign to file a report with Congress evaluating the benefits to consumers).
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ifies as a secure one. 1 4 1 These preconditions allow for the scientific and
technology communities to review the particular technology. Additionally, disclosure and notice provisions will make other businesses and
consumers aware of another method of generating an electronic signature. 14 2 Accordingly, electronic signature technology will continue to
grow and the comfort of business and consumers will increase. 14 3 By
protecting the nonsecure electronic signatures as well as the secure ones,
the new provisions of E-Sign will avoid the dangerous rigidity found in
144
the current provisions of E-Sign.
141. The preconditions are that: (i) the security procedure is completely open and fully
disclosed to the public and (ii) the security procedure has been generally accepted in the
applicable information-security or scientific community as being capable of functioning in a
trustworthy manner.
142. Disclosure is essential because the Secretary of Commerce must determine
whether the security procedure has been generally accepted in the applicable informationsecurity or scientific community. Furthermore, the Secretary of Commerce must consider
the opinion of independent experts in the applicable field and the published findings of
such community, such as the American National Standards Institute, the International
Standards Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
143. Behn, supra n. 125, at 217. "The concepts of a secure electronic record and a secure
electronic signature, and the rebuttable presumptions that flow from that status, are critical to enabling a viable system of electronic commerce." Id. (citing 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1751
10-120 cmt. (1)). Behn finds statements proclaiming that giving legal protection to digital
signatures will increase e-commerce unfounded for two reasons. First, e-commerce appears
viable without having to establishing rebuttable presumptions; second, e-commerce has
grown at an explosive rate. Id. There are two problems with this reasoning. First, measuring explosive growth of e-commerce from the beginning of the e-commerce era is misleading because e-commerce began as early as four years ago. Measuring something that is
as popular and widely used as the Internet from its inception is misleading. Second, by
providing another reason for using digital signatures, business and consumers are more
likely to use secure electronic signatures. An example of where the rebuttable presumption
may assist consumers and the marketplace is in the purchase of automobiles. Ford Motor
Company's research shows that 57 percent of consumers in the market for a new vehicle
within the next year prefer to research their automotive purchase online, and 44 percent of
consumers who use the Internet or online services have visited financial sites. Skogen Testimony, supra n. 43, at 7. About one-third of customers want to at least start the financing
process online, according to Ford Credit research. Id. It goes without saying the consumers and automobile vendors may be more willing to begin these financial transactions if
these presumptions were in place. "Uniform standards for electronic signatures would enhance public confidence in online applications of electronic commerce like [electronic funds
transfer]." Id. at %8.
144. Sargent Testimony, supra n. 41, at $ 30. A serious impact is the inability of state
law to react to technological change by not allowing the needed flexibility to respond to the
eminent technological change. Id. Also, Behn argues that the rebuttable presumption does
little to increase the international commerce. Behn, supra n. 125, at 217. This is unfounded given that the European Union ("EL") is considering a digital-signature directive
that does precisely what these new provisions propose to do in that the EU would provide
greater legal protection for electronic signatures produced by a certain technology. Pincus
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CONCLUSION
E-Sign and UETA are legislative efforts to bring order and uniformity where there was a complete lack of organization and cohesion. The
preemption provisions are inconsistent with the stated goals of creating
legal uniformity and allowing e-commerce to realize its full potential. 145
The only way in which section 7002(a)(1) can foster uniformity is if ESign completely preempts the state version of UETA regardless of the
degree of modification. The problem is that E-Sign does not make it
clear that making minor modifications to UETA will lead to preemption
of the state version. This lack of clarity leads to confusion and a lack of
uniformity, which impacts the growth of e-commerce. 14 6 UETA and ESign were drafted because businesses and consumers were baffled by the
lack of clarity and uniformity of the state laws. Ironically, the inability
to define the relationship between E-Sign and UETA with specificity still
creates an environment of legal uncertainty and a potential lack of
uniformity.147
Section 7002(a)(2) while not erecting a barrier to uniformity or actively diminishing the growth of e-commerce is antithetical to the very
foundation of any electronic signature statute. Authenticating the person signing a transmission and verifying the contents of a transmission
are foundational principles of any signature provision. Currently, ESign mandates that all technologies be treated equally in that no specific
technology will receive greater legal protection. This technology neutral
approach is not the best way to promote e-commerce. A better way for ESign to promote e-commerce would be to give greater legal protection to
specific technologies. Specific technologies encourage the use of those
methods that are better able to authenticate and verify the integrity of a
transmission.
Testimony, supra n. 52, at T 12. Consequently, using the proposed method will make the
uniform U.S. digital-signature law consistent with that of the EU's.
Technological methods of electronic attribution are evolving rapidly, and the creation
of further authentication technologies will doubtlessly occur. Id. at II 6. "The private sector
today is using many forms of electronic authentication." Id. Most electronic transactions
now occur in a closed system-systems where the parties with a preexisting relationship
conduct electronic transactions under a mutually agreed system. Id. at 8. There is hope
that in the distant future, there will be comprehensive, real-time authentication system.
Id. Under the proposed provisions, a real-time method of authenticating an electronic signature falls within E-Sign even before verification that it is a secure method. This is evidence of the flexibility the new provisions provide. Additionally, the increased legal
protection provides an incentive for businesses to work towards producing a real-time authentication system.
145. H.R. Rpt. 106-341(I), supra n. 42, Purpose and Summary at 1.
146. See Skogen Testimony, supra n. 43, at 10.
147. See H.R.Rpt. 106-341 (II), supra n. 43, Background and Need for the Legislation at
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These new preemption provisions are more forceful and less confusing than the current preemption provisions of E-Sign. The proposed section 7002(a)(1) clearly articulates the relationship between E-Sign and
UETA to the point where there is no ambiguity. The proposed section
7002(a)(2) takes a very common sense approach in that it provides
greater legal protection to those technologies that are able to authenticate the sender and to verify the integrity of a transmission. These proposed provisions provide clarity, uniformity, while promotion of secure
technologies and the development of secure technologies. These goals
are accomplished while respecting the role of UETA in creating clarity
and uniformity. 148 These provisions create confidence in conducting business electronically and allow e-commerce to reach its full potential.
Renard Francoist

148. Sargent Testimony, supra n. 41, at
6-15. Two fundamental principles of UETA
are to encourage and maximize the freedom of markets to achieve efficient and fair market
solutions and to protect the freedom of both technology and markets to continue to evolve
and develop. Id. at $117. Ms. Sargent notes another impact is on the federal court system.
Id. at 31. Under the current preemption principles, it is possible that every contract case
questioning the validity or legal effect of an electronic signature and record inherently contains a federal question. Id. Consequently, federal jurisdiction applies in a rather large
number of cases in which federal jurisdiction presently is not now a question. While it is
difficult to know for sure the impact on the federal courts, it is important to note the potential impact that this may have on the federal judiciary and their already crowded docket.
f The author is a staff attorney in the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal
Trade Commission in Washington, DC. The views expressed in this comment do not represent the position of the FTC. The author has obtained the following degrees: B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., George Washington University Law School; LL.M. in
Information Technology and Privacy Law, John Marshall Law School. The author would
like to express his appreciation to Drs. Doris and Howard Francois, Ethel Wright, Leslie
Reis, David Sorkin, Alex Wilson, Deborah McLochlin, Kristen Yoo, Frances Hadfield, and
many others for their support and advice.
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APPENDIX 1
PROPOSED NEW SECTION

15 U.S.C. § 7002

§ 7002. Exemption to preemption
(a) In general. A State statute, regulation, or other rule of law may modify, limit, or supersede the provisions of section 7001 with respect to
State law only if such statute, regulation, or rule of law(1) Any state statute, regulation, or other rule of law must constitute an
enactment or adoption of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act as approved and recommended for enactment in all States by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999, except
that any exception to the scope of such Act enacted by a State under
section 3(b)(4) that is inconsistent with Titles I, Title II, or 7002(a)(2) the
exception is preempted in its entirety.
(2)(A) specifies the alternative procedures, requirements, or alternative
procedures or requirements part of any exception made under section
3(b)(4) of UETA for the use or acceptance (or both) of electronic records or
electronic signatures to establish the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of contracts or other records, if(i) such alternative procedures or requirements are consistent with this
title and title II [15 USCS § § 7001 et seq. and 15 USCS § 7021]; and
(ii) such alternative procedures or requirements may require, or accord
greater legal status or effect to, the implementation or application of a
specific technology or technical specification for performing the functions
of creating, storing, generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic records or electronic signatures; if
(aa) through the use of a qualified security procedure, it can be verified
that an electronic signature is the signature of a specific person, then
such electronic signature shall be considered to be a secure electronic
signature at the time of verification, if the relying party establishes that
the qualified security procedure was:
(aa) commercially reasonable under the circumstances;
(bb) applied by the relying party in a trustworthy manner; and
(cc) relied on in a reasonable manner and in good faith by the relying
party.
(B) a qualified security procedure for purposes of this Section is a security procedure for identifying a person that is:
(i) previously agreed to by the parties; or
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(ii) certified by the Secretary of Commerce as being capable of creating,
in a trustworthy manner, an electronic signature that:
(aa) is unique to the signer within the context in which it is used;
(bb) can be used to objectively identify the person signing the electronic
record;
(cc) was reliably created by such identified person, and that cannot be
readily duplicated or compromised; and
(dd) is created, and is linked to the electronic record to which it relates,
in a manner such that if the record or the signature is intentionally or
unintentionally changed after signing the electronic signature is
invalidated.
(iii) a digital signature that is created using an asymmetric algorithm
certified by the Secretary of Commerce shall be considered to be a qualified security procedure for purposes of identifying a person if:
(aa) the digital signature was created during the operational period of a
valid certificate, was used within the scope of any other restrictions specified or incorporated by reference in the certificate, if any, and can be
verified by reference to the public key listed in the certificate; and
(bb) the certificate is considered trustworthy because the certificate was
issued by a certification authority in accordance with standards, procedures, and other requirements specified by the Secretary of Commerce,
or the trier of fact independently finds that the certificate was issued in a
trustworthy manner by a certification authority that properly authenticated the subscriber and the subscriber's public key, or otherwise finds
that the material information set forth in the certificate is true.
(C) A security procedure may be certified by the Secretary of Commerce,
as a qualified security procedure, following an appropriate investigation
or review, if:
(i) the security procedure is completely open and fully disclosed to the
public, and has been so for a sufficient length of time, so as to facilitate a
comprehensive review and evaluation of its suitability for the intended
purpose by the applicable information security or scientific community;
(ii) the security procedure has been generally accepted in the applicable
information security or scientific community as being capable of satisfying the requirements of Section 7002(a)(2)(B)(ii) in a trustworthy manner; and
(iii) in making a determination regarding whether the security procedure has been generally accepted in the applicable information security
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or scientific community, the Secretary of Commerce shall consider the
opinion of independent experts in the applicable field and the published
findings of such community, including applicable standards
organizations.
PROPOSED NEW SECTION

15 U.S.C. § 7002(B)

(1)(a) In resolving a civil dispute involving a secure electronic signature,
it shall be rebuttably presumed that the secure electronic signature is
the signature of the person to whom it correlates.
(b) The effect of presumptions provided in this Section is to place on the
party challenging the genuineness of a secure electronic signature both
the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the presumption and
the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the nonexistence of the
presumed fact is more probable than its existence.

